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LABOR LAW-THE CURRENT SCOPE OF WEINGARTEN RIGHTS IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT:
NLRB v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc.,I the Supreme Court of the United
States stated that section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
"creates a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without
union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may re-
sult in his discipline."'2 The Weingarten Court stated that this right is
only triggered when the "employee requests representation"3 and "rea-
sonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action." 4
Under Weingarten, the circuit courts have seldom denied an em-
ployee's statutory right to union representation upon request during a
disciplinary interview. 5 Neither the Supreme Court6 nor the majority of
circuit courts, however, have addressed the issue of what form the re-
1. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). For a discussion of Weingarten, see infra notes 44-51
and accompanying text.
2. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256. The Court was approving a National Labor
Relations Board construction of § 7 of the NLRA first announced in Quality
Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972) and refined in Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B.
1052 (1972). Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256.
3. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257. In Weingarten, the employee had asked re-
peatedly for a union representative to be present. Id. at 254.
4. Id. at 257. The Court emphasized that "reasonable belief" would be
measured by objective standards and not by probing an employee's subjective
motivations or state of mind. Id. at 257 n.5.
5. See, e.g., Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting
interpretation of § 7 of the NLRA as guaranteeing nonunion employee right to
representation at investigatory interview); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 711
F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Weingarten rights under § 7 of NLRA
include right to know purpose of interview and right to pre-interview conference
with union representative); NLRB v. Kahn's & Co., 694 F.2d 1070, 1071 (6th
Cir. 1982) (finding unfair labor practice to refuse employee's request to have
union steward present during interview leading to employee's discharge); IRS v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 671 F.2d 560, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding un-
fair labor practice for IRS to deny employee request for union representation
when that employee reasonably fears discipline may result, even though that em-
ployee is not subject of investigation). But cf Johnson v. Express One Int'l, Inc.,
944 F.2d 247, 251-52 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding lack of "mutual aid or protection"
language in Railway Labor Act means that no right exists under Act for nonun-
ion employee to have co-worker present during investigatory interview when no
elected bargaining unit exists); Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11, 12-13 (3d Cir.
1989) (noting that in non-union setting, reasonable to find employee's Wein-
garten rights do not extend to request for presence of fellow employee of own
choosing in investigatory meeting).
6. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257. The Weingarten Court simply stated that
"the right arises only in situations where the employee requests representation.
(1139)
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quest must take. 7 Relying on NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,8 the
Third Circuit, in NLRB v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. ,9 determined that
an employee's question as to whether a union representative should be
present at a meeting is a request for such representation and is sufficient
to trigger that employee's rights under Weingarten.10
In New Jersey Bell, the Third Circuit focused on three major issues.
First, the court reiterated the proper standard for reviewing decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).t I Second, the court deter-
mined whether an employee's question as to the necessity or desirability
of a union representative at a meeting is sufficient to trigger that em-
ployee's Weingarten rights.12 Third, the court determined whether New
Jersey Bell's refusal to release certain information to a bargaining repre-
sentative fell within the Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 13 exception to the NLRB v.
Acme Industrial Co. 14 interpretation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 15
This Casebrief will examine the reasoning in New Jersey Bell and will
In other words, the employee may forgo his guaranteed right and, if he prefers,
participate in an interview unaccompanied by his union representative." Id.
7. See NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 674 F.2d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 1982)(holding employee question as to whether union representative should be pres-
ent during interview to be adequate request to trigger Weingarten); Lennox In-
dus., Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir.) (finding that single initial
request for union representation made to supervisor is sufficient for multiple
meetings when meetings are part of "single, interrelated episode" and supervi-
sor attends all meetings, even though company official conducting meetings is
unaware of initial request), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
8. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982). In Illinois Bell, the Seventh Circuit held
that an employee's question, "Should I have someone in here with me, someone
from the union?" was sufficiently direct to trigger the employee's Weingarten
rights. Id. at 621.
9. 936 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1991).
10. Id. at 149. For a discussion of the facts and the specific query in New
Jersey Bell, see infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
11. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 146-48. For a discussion of the standard of
review, see infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
12. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 148-50. For a discussion of the right to
union representation, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text, and infra notes
41-62 and accompanying text.
13. 237 N.L.R.B. 982 (1978). The NLRB stated: "We do not believe that
the principle set forth in Acme [sic] and related cases dealing with the statutory
obligation to furnish information may properly be extended so as to require an
employer to provide a union with [witness] statements obtained during the
course of an employer's investigation of employee misconduct." Id. at 984. For
a discussion of Anheuser-Busch, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
14. 385 U.S. 432 (1967). For a discussion of Acme, see infra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text.
15. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 150-53. In Acme, the Supreme Court con-
firmed a union's statutory right to request and receive certain information from
a company during a grievance process when the information appears necessary
to the proper performance of the union's representative duties. Acme, 385 U.S.
at 435-36.
1140 [Vol. 37: p. 1139
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/24
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW




Elizabeth Lynch, an employee of New Jersey Bell, was investigated
for the alleged unauthorized access and disclosure of an unlisted tele-
phone number. 16 Two security representatives interviewed Lynch con-
cerning this matter. 17 At the beginning of the interview, Lynch asked
whether she should have a union representative present.' 8 Lorraine
Vasilik, one of the security representatives, told Lynch that she should
see what the interview was about first and then make her decision re-
garding the union representative. 19 After disclosing the purpose of the
interview, the security representative did not ask Lynch whether she
then wanted to have a union representative present. 20 The security rep-
resentative simply moved on and began to present Lynch with evidence
of the alleged accessing of the account.2 ' Even though she had denied
disclosing the unlisted number, Lynch signed a confession at the end of
the interview, apparently without realizing that it included an admission
to the disclosure. 2 2 Five days after the interview, the customer com-
plained again. Lynch was not informed of the second complaint. 2" The
complaint became part of a security report which formed the basis of a
memo to Bell's Director of Business Services. 24 On the basis of this
memo, Lynch was suspended for five days.2 5
16. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 145. A customer had complained about calls
to her unlisted number. Id. A security representative at New Jersey Bell found
that Elizabeth Lynch had accessed that customer's account without authoriza-
tion. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. According to Carmine Inteso, one of the security representatives,
Lynch's request occurred as soon as the two security representatives had intro-
duced themselves. Id. at 145 n.1.
19. Id. at 145.
20. Id. at 145-46. When Vasilik finished explaining the purpose of the in-
terview, she asked Lynch whether she could tape the meeting and then pro-
ceeded immediately with the investigation. Id. at 146.
21. Id. After seeing the evidence in the form of computer records, Lynch
admitted accessing the account. Id.
22. Id. The confession was an admission to accessing the account and dis-
closing the unlisted number. Id.
23. Id. The memo was written by Lynch's manager who had relied on
Vasilik's security report. Id. The customer alleged that Lynch had called her,
told her about the interview and that she, Lynch, was going to lose her job and
be criminally prosecuted. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) (300
N.L.R.B. No. 6) 1241, 1241 (Sept. 28, 1990). Lynch allegedly stated to the cus-
tomer that she, the customer, could be sued for defamation of character. Id.
24. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 146.
25. Id. Bell's Director of Business Services decided the length of the sus-
pension and Lynch's manager imposed it. Id.
11411992]
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After the imposition of the suspension, Lynch's union filed a griev-
ance on her behalf.26 The union was denied access to the security re-
port and to certain portions of the evidence against Lynch. 2 7 Following
repeated denials of access to the information, the union filed charges of
unfair labor practices with the NLRB under sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5)
of the NLRA. 28 The Board concluded that New Jersey Bell had engaged
-in unfair labor practices by violating Lynch's right to have a union repre-
sentative present and by withholding the requested information. 29
B. The Third Circuit's Analysis
1. Standard of Review
The Third Circuit first determined the appropriate standard of re-
view for the NLRB's decision that NewJersey Bell had engaged in unfair
labor practices by failing to provide union representation and withhold-
26. Id. Lynch's union, Communications Workers of America (CWA), was
an intervenor in this appeal. Id. at 146 & n.4.
27. Id. at 146. The union requested copies of the security report and the
computer records. Id. Lynch's manager at New Jersey Bell, Anne Tovey, with-
held part of the computer records on the basis that they were irrelevant and the
entire security report on the basis that it was confidential. Id.
28. Id. Section 7 of the NLRA creates the statutory right to union represen-
tation to receive such information upon request. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S.
251, 256 (1975). The denial of this right violates section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA.
Id. at 257 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972)). Section 7 of the
NLRA reads in full:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA reads in full:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title[.]
Id. § 158(a)(1).
Further, a company will violate its statutory obligation to bargain collec-
tively under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA if it refuses "to provide information
that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its
duties." NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967). Section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA reads in full:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
29. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 146; New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 135 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) (300 N.L.R.B. No. 6) 1241 (Sept. 28, 1990).
4
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ing information. 30 The New Jersey Bell court relied on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. 3 1 The Court in Chevron outlined a two-part analysis for
federal court review of an agency's interpretation of the statute it ad-
ministers. 32 The Third Circuit, using NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, added a third prong to the analysis.3 3 First "is the ques-
tion whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter
.... ' The court will follow the express language of the statute and
decide on the agency's ruling accordingly.3 5 Second, "if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."'3 6 In other words, "[w]hen the Board's con-
30. NewJersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 146. The Board maintained that the issue of
Lynch's request for union representation was purely a question of fact and the
decision should be upheld if it is supported by "substantial evidence on the rec-
ord as a whole." Id. at 146-47 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988)). The Third
Circuit, however, held that the issue was one of mixed law and fact. Id. at 147.
The Third Circuit stated that the question of whether Lynch actually asked for
union representation was one of fact and to be upheld if supported by "substan-
tial evidence." Id. On the other hand, the question of whether Lynch's query
was sufficient to trigger her rights under Weingarten was a question of law con-
cerning the construction of the NLRA to be examined using the test outlined in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). The Third Circuit also determined that the Chevron test was applicable
to the second issue regarding the Board's construction of the NLRA with respect
to Bell's withholding of information. NewJersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 147. For a dis-
cussion of Chevron, see infra notes 31-32 & 34-36 and accompanying text.
31. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron involved the Environmental Protection
Agency's construction of the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1977. Id. at 839-40.
The Third Circuit invoked the Clean Air Act case because, while New Jersey Bell
clearly did not involve the Clean Air Act, Chevron sets forth "the general princi-
ples to be applied when federal courts review an agency's interpretation of the
statute it implements." New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 147 (quoting Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 663 (1990)). In New Jersey Bell, the court was
reviewing the Board's interpretation of the NLRA. Id.
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
33. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 147. The Third Circuit cited the United Food
Court as stating: "[W]e have traditionally accorded the Board deference with
regard to its interpretation of the NLRA as long as its interpretation is rational
and consistent with the statute." Id. (quoting United Food, 484 U.S. 112, 123
(1987).
34. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. "[T]he court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. The
Court added in a footnote: "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are
contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9.
35. Id. at 842-43.
36. Id. at 843. The Supreme Court stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific pro-
vision of the statute by regulation .... Sometimes the legislative dele-
gation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
5
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struction of the Act is one permissible interpretation out of many, this
court is not free to substitute its preference for that of the Board."1
3 7
Finally, if the NLRB's interpretation is a permissible one, the court must
determine whether that interpretation is consistent with past Board de-
cisions on the matter.38
In New Jersey Bell, the Third Circuit found that the NLRB's actions
did not directly conflict with congressional intent or the express lan-
guage of the statute.3 9 Therefore, the court analyzed the Board's deci-
sion to determine whether it was a permissible construction of the
NLRA. 40
2. Requirement of Union Representation
The second, and most important, issue the Third Circuit faced was
whether New Jersey Bell committed an unfair labor practice by failing to
grant Lynch's apparent request for union representation. 4 1 In order to
make this determination, the court relied on two cases: NLRB v. Wein-
garten, Inc.42 and NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
4 3
In Weingarten, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's construction
of section 7 of the NLRA. 44 This construction created a "statutory right
in an employee to refuse to submit without union representation to an
interview which he [or she] reasonably fears may result in his [or her]
discipline."' 45 In Weingarten, a store employee had been accused of steal-
ing.46 During the investigative interview, the employee asked several
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the ad-
ministrator of an agency.
Id. at 843-44.
37. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 147.
38. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112,
124 n.20 (1987). In United Food, the Supreme Court stated: "We also consider
the consistency with which an agency interpretation has been applied, and
whether the interpretation was contemporaneous with the enactment of the stat-
ute being construed." Id.
39. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 148. New Jersey Bell did not contend that
the NLRB's findings conflicted with congressional intent or with the text of the
NLRA. Id. The Third Circuit, therefore, did not address that question and pro-
ceeded to the second prong of the Chevron test. Id. For the text of the relevant
portions of the NLRA, see supra note 28.
40. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 148. The Third Circuit reviewed the Board's
findings to see "whether the Board implemented a permissible interpretation of
the Act, and [to ensure] consistency with prior Board practice." Id.
41. Id.
42. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
43. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260. For the text of § 7 of the NLRA (29 U.S.C.
§ 157), see supra note 28.
45. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256.
46. Id. at 254. Employee Collins had been accused of stealing $1.98 worth
of chicken. Id. After Collins' explanation for the erroneous interpretation of
1144
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times for the presence of the shop steward or some other union repre-
sentative. 4 7 The store manager denied each request. 4 8 The employee's
union subsequently filed charges of unfair labor practices with the
NLRB. 49
Nevertheless, the Weingarten court emphasized that the right to a
union representative is limited. First, the employee must request such
representation.5 0 Second, the right only arises in situations where the
employee reasonably believes that disciplinary action will result from the
interview. 5 '
The threshold question, therefore, is whether the "employee ex-
pressed some desire to have a union representative present during the
interview."' 52 The issue in New Jersey Bell was whether Lynch's query as
to the desirability or necessity of the presence of a union representative
her actions had "checked out" and the store manager had apologized, Collins
started to cry and said that the only thing that she had received for free from the
store was lunch. Id. at 255. Collins had apparently been under the impression
that free lunches were store policy. Id. The manager thought otherwise, and
along with a store investigator, began to interrogate Collins. Id.
47. Id. at 254-55. Collins asked for union representation both before and
after breaking into tears and revealing her practice of taking free lunches. Id.
48. Id. The Court noted:
The denial of this right [to have a union representative present] has a
reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act [NLRA]. Thus, it is a serious
violation of the employee's individual right to engage in concerted ac-
tivity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the em-
ployer denies the employee's request and compels the employee to
appear unassisted at an interview which may put his job security in
jeopardy.
Id. at 257 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972)).
49. Id. at,256. The NLRB found that almost everyone in employee Collins'
department, including the manager of the department, took free lunches from
the store. Id. at 255. In fact, the company headquarters actually told the investi-
gator interrogating Collins that it was uncertain as to the policy regarding free
lunches. Id. at 255-56. At that point, the investigator terminated the interview
and told Collins not to tell anyone about it. Id. at 256. Nevertheless, Collins
reported the incident to her union. Id.
50. Id. at 257. Even though there is a statutory right to union representa-
tion, "the employee may forgo his guaranteed right and, if he prefers, partici-
pate in an interview unaccompanied by his union representative." Id.
51. Id. The Court noted:
We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-floor conver-
sations as, for example, the giving of instruction or training or needed
corrections of work techniques. In such cases there cannot normally be
any reasonable basis for an employee to fear that any adverse impact
may result from the interview, and thus we would then see no reason-
able basis for him to seek the assistance of his representative.
Id. at 257-58 (quoting Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 199 (1972)).
52. NLRB v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1991).
According to the testimony of the two security representatives, the first words
employee Lynch uttered in the interview were concerning whether she should
have union representation. Id. at 149.
7
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at her interview was a request sufficient to trigger her rights under
Weingarten.5s
To answer this question, the Third Circuit relied on NLRB v. Illinois
Bell Telephone Co. 54 In Illinois Bell, an employee was being investigated
for misuse of toll call privileges. 55 After learning the purpose of the
interview, the employee asked, "Should I have someone in here with
me, someone from the union?" 56 The security agent replied, "No, it is
not necessary as long as you are honest with me."15 7 In the proceeding
before the NLRB, the company stated that it had not denied the em-
ployee the right to union representation because the employee had
never requested it.5 8 The Seventh Circuit held that such a query is suffi-
cient to trigger an employee's rights under Weingarten because the
"question . . . put [the security agent] on notice of [the employee's] in-
terest in having 'someone from the union' present during the
interrogation." 59
Based upon Illinois Bell, the Third Circuit in New Jersey Bell held that
Lynch's query had been sufficient to trigger her Weingarten rights.60 The
Third Circuit stated:
Once on notice that an employee desires representation, the
company acts at its peril if it does not exercise one of three
options: grant the employee's request for a representative,
give the employee the option of either continuing the interview
53. Id. at 148. In Weingarten, employee Collins had asked specifically and
repeatedly for the presence of a union representative. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at
254-55. In New Jersey Bell, employee Lynch did not specifically request represen-
tation, she only asked whether a union representative should be there. New Jersey
Bell, 936 F.2d at 145. Furthermore, she only made this inquiry once. Id.
54. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 620-21. The investigation concerned the alleged reduction of
time charges on long distance calls made from a local prison. Id. at 620.
56. Id. at 621.
57. Id.
58. Id. In order for an employee's Weingarten rights to be triggered, the
employee must request union representation. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251, 257 (1975).
59. Illinois Bell, 674 F.2d at 621-22.
60. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 149. The Administrative Law Judge had
concluded:
Thus, (security representative] Vasilik in my view misled [employee]
Lynch into believing that once the purpose of the interview was ex-
plained to her, she would have an opportunity to decide whether she
wants representation, before the interview proceeded. Not only did
Vasilik not ask Lynch at that point whether she now wished union rep-
resentation or not, but charged ahead without even a hesitation to in-
terrogate Lynch about matters under investigation .... Vasilik instead
proceeded with the interview, without as much as a pause to permit
Lynch to make a decision, that Vasilik had suggested to her that she
would be able to make.
Id. (quoting Appendix at 36a-37a, New Jersey Bell (Nos. 90-3857, 91-3060) (opin-
ion of Administration Law Judge)).
1146 [Vol. 37: p. 1139
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without representation or foregoing the interview, or, termi-
nate the interview.61
Since New Jersey Bell had notice of Lynch's desire for representation
and did none of the above, the company committed an unfair labor prac-
tice in violation of the NLRA.62
3. Withholding of Information
The third issue the court faced was whether the NLRB's finding that
New Jersey Bell violated the NLRA by withholding certain information
was a "permissible construction of the statute."163
In NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,64 the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]here can be no question of the general obligation of an employer to
provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for
the proper performance of its duties." 65 The Court further noted that
this disclosure extended to grievances because, otherwise, a union
would be forced "to take a grievance all the way through to arbitration
without providing the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim."'6 6
61. Id. at 148-49.
62. Id. at 149. Under the applicable standard of review, the court must also
determine that the ruling of the Board is consistent with past decisions. For a
discussion of the standard for reviewing the NLRB's decisions, see supra note 38
and accompanying text. The Third Circuit determined that "[t]he Board has
consistently held that a request must only be sufficient to put the employer on
notice that the employee desires representation." New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at
149; see also Montgomery Ward & Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1227 (1984) (holding
that request for statutorily ineligible Weingarten representative is still sufficient
request because it puts employer on notice that employee desires representa-
tion); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1223 (1977) (holding that
statement "I would like to have someone there that could explain to me what
was happening" is sufficient request to trigger rights under Weingarten).
63. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 150. The Third Circuit characterized a com-
pany's duty to provide information as "part of its statutory obligation to bargain
collectively." Id.
64. 385 U.S. 432 (1967). In Acme, a union's collective bargaining agree-
ment provided certain safeguards for workers in the event that equipment and
jobs were moved out of the plant. Id. at 433-34. When the union discovered
that equipment was being moved from the plant, it requested certain informa-
tion about this activity. Id. at 434. The company claimed that no violation of the
collective bargaining agreement had occurred and, therefore, they refused to
disclose the information. Id. at 434-35. In response, the union filed unfair labor
practices charges with the NLRB. Id. at 435.
65. Id. at 435-36. The NLRB had found in this case that the information
was "necessary in order to enable the Union to evaluate intelligently the griev-
ances filed." Id. at 435.
66. Id. at 438. The actual issue in this case had been whether the "Board
must await an arbitrator's determination of the relevancy of the requested infor-
mation before it can enforce the union's statutory rights." Id. at 436. The Court
concluded that the Board's action of enforcing the rights of the union aided
arbitration because "[a]rbitration can function properly only if the grievance
procedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious claims." Id. at 438.
9
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New Jersey Bell argued that the information in this case was ex-
empted from disclosure because of the exception to Acme outlined in
Anheuser-Busch. 6 7 In Anheuser-Busch, the Board held "that the duty to pro-
vide a union with information related to a pending grievance does not
extend to witness statements."' 68 The Third Circuit, however, indicated
that the NLRB has strictly limited that holding to witness statements.6 9
Further, the court found persuasive the NLRB's holding in United Tech-
nologies Corp. ,70 in which the Board "ordered the disclosure of all inter-
67. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 150-51; see Anheuser-Busch, 237 N.L.R.B.
982 (1978). In Anheuser-Busch, employee Roberts had been involved in several
altercations with other employees at work and had been suspended. Id. at 982.
He filed a grievance alleging unjust suspension. Id. During the investigation,
the company asked the employees that Roberts had had altercations with to put
their versions of the stories in writing. Id. At the grievance hearing, the union
requested copies of those statements. Id. The company refused, saying that the
names of the witnesses were confidential. Id. The Board held that there was no
statutory obligation to disclose witness statements because such statements "are
fundamentally different from the types of information contemplated in Acme
[sic], and disclosure of witness statements involves critical considerations which
do not apply to requests for other types of information." Id. at 984. Specifically,
exemption of witness statements from disclosure is intended to prevent coercion
or intimidation of witnesses into changing their testimony or refusing to testify.
New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 150-51 & n.9 (discussing NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-40 (1978), as foundation of Anheuser-Busch
holding).
68. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 150 (discussing Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 237
N.L.R.B. 982 (1978)).
69. Id. at 151. The Third Circuit commented that "[t]he Board has refused
to extend the Anheuser-Busch holding beyond witness statements.... Notably,
Anheuser-Busch specifically left intact a prior holding that lists of witnesses' names
and addresses had to be released to employee representatives." Id.; see also
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) (301 N.L.R.B. No. 138)
1225, 1228-29 (Feb. 28, 1991) (holding that while protecting informant's iden-
tity, company must disclose summary of informant's statement in sufficient de-
tail for union to determine basis for company's suspicions regarding employee);
GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 1989 NLRB LEXIS 402, at *167-68
(June 13, 1989) (holding that company had duty to provide union with informa-
tion regarding alleged sabotage including names of witnesses of alleged sabo-
tage, but excluding witness statements).
70. 277 N.L.R.B. 584 (1985). In United Technologies, employee Lovely was
suspended and discharged for alleged gross negligence in the performance of
his assigned duties as an x-ray film reader. Id. at 584. The union filed griev-
ances with respect to these disciplinary actions. Id. During the proceedings, the
company refused to disclose certain information requested by the union. Id. at
585. One piece of information was an internal security report which the com-
pany refused to disclose on the ground that it contained witness statements. Id.
The NLRB concluded that because the alleged witness statements in the report
were actually compilations of data by the company's own technical experts and
because they formed the basis for the disciplinary action against Lovely, they
should have been released. Id. The NLRB distinguished Anheuser-Busch on the
grounds that the statements in that case had
nothing to do with technical data and the rationale . . . [in Anheuser-
Busch] would not, in any event, cover the situation of this case. In the
present case, the identity of the persons who made the reports-or, as
the Respondent would have it, who gave the statements-is already
1148 [Vol. 37: p. 1139
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nal security investigative reports concerning alleged employee
negligence."' 71 The Third Circuit acknowledged factual differences be-
tween United Technologies and New Jersey Bell,72 but stated that "United
Technologies stands for the broader proposition that investigative reports,
relied upon by management when disciplining an employee, are gener-
ally discoverable."7 3 Consequently, the Third Circuit ruled that the
Board's finding of a violation based on the withheld information was a
permissible interpretation of the NLRA.74
III. CONCLUSION
In reaching its conclusions in New Jersey Bell, the Third Circuit relied
on the proposition that if the NLRB makes a reasonable and permissible
interpretation of a statute, that interpretation will be upheld absent con-
trary congressional intent.75 Consistent with this standard, the Third
Circuit upheld the NLRB's ruling that a mere query by an employee
about whether a union representative will be necessary or desirable trig-
gers the employee's Weingarten rights. 76 Furthermore, the Third Circuit
upheld the NLRB's ruling that disclosure of certain information in a dis-
ciplinary proceeding is required under Acme despite the Anheuser-Busch
witness-statements exception. 77
known and the nature of the information contained in them is such that
their disclosure cannot result in recantation or modification of the facts
stated in them by reason of intimidation of the investigators who fur-
nished the statements or anyone who might be named in their state-
ments. They did not investigate incidents. They investigated pieces of
film. No amount of intimidation can change what is on that film.
Id. at 589.
71. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 151 (discussing United Technologies Corp.,
277 N.L.R.B. 584 (1985)). For a discussion of the Board's reasoning in United
Technologies, see supra note 70.
72. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 151. The security reports in United Technolo-
gies involved technical data regarding the employee's exercise of a duty of care in
reading x-ray film to inspect aircraft engine parts for defects. United Technologies,
277 N.L.R.B. at 589.
73. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 151. "It would be difficult for an employee's
representative to be effective without access to the facts underlying manage-
ment's disciplinary decision." Id.
74. Id. at 152. There was a dissent on the NLRB as to the disclosure issue.
Id. The Third Circuit noted that "neither view conflicts with Congressional in-
tent as expressed in the NLRA. It is in this twilight zone of administrative dis-
cretion where we believe that the Board should be affirmed under either the
view of the majority or of the dissent." Id.
75. Id. at 147, 153. The Board's interpretation must also be compatible
with prior Board decisions in order to be upheld. Id. at 153. For a discussion of
the determination of compatibility with prior decisions, see supra notes 38 & 62
and accompanying text.
76. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 150.
77. Id. at 153. The Third Circuit determined that the duty to balance the
interests between the right to know certain information and the problem of har-
assment of witnesses is a duty delegated to the wisdom and expertise of the
11
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These rulings are important for two major reasons. First, the Third
Circuit has extended the triggering of Weingarten rights to include mere
queries by employees as to the necessity or desirability of union repre-
sentation. 78 Once such a query is made, the employer is deemed to be
on notice that the employer desires union representation. 79 At that
point, an employer can either allow union representation, give the em-
ployee the choice of continuing the interview without a representative or
end the interview.8 0 If an employer takes any other action, that em-
ployer is risking a violation of the NLRA. 8 1 Second, an employer's dis-
closure obligations in a grievance or disciplinary proceeding are now
expanded. The witness-statements exception outlined in Anheuser-
Busch 82 will be narrowly construed in the Third Circuit, and investiga-
tive reports used in disciplinary action will generally be discoverable. 83
Stephen Donweber
NLRB by Congress. Id. Therefore, as long as the result reached by the Board is
reasonable, it will be upheld. Id.
78. Id. at 148-50.
79. Id. at 148; see NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 674 F.2d 618, 622 (7th Cir.
1982). For a discussion of Illinois Bell, see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying
text.
80. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 148-49.
81. Id. at 148.
82. For a discussion of the exception, see supra notes 67-68 and accompany-
ing text.
83. New Jersey Bell, 936 F.2d at 151.
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